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People with schizophrenia often exhibit difficulties to comprehend figurative expressions,
such as irony, proverbs, metaphors and idioms, with a general proneness to neglect
the figurative meaning and to accept the more literal one. This inability is usually
referred to as concretism and it constitutes a clinical manifestation of the broader
language dysfunction called Formal Thought Disorder. The current review focuses
on the neuropsychological and neuroanatomical underpinnings of schizophrenics’
misinterpretation of a subgroup of figurative expressions, i.e., metaphors. Metaphors
are heterogeneous in nature, classifiable according to various criteria; for instance,
metaphors can be conventional and familiar, or conversely, novel and unusual. These
linguistic distinctions are substantial because the comprehension of the different types of
metaphor entails partially different cognitive strategies and neural substrates. This review
gathers studies that have directly investigated which neurocognitive deficits explain the
inefficient comprehension of metaphor in schizophrenia. Several impairments have been
put forward, such as general intelligence, executive functions and theory of mind deficits.
Moreover, the neural correlates of metaphor comprehension in schizophrenia, like the
left inferior/medial frontal gyrus and the temporal lobe, match those cortices affected by
the neuropathology of schizophrenia. Even though the causal defective mechanism is
still a matter of investigation, we provide an attempt to integrate existing findings.
Keywords: metaphor, schizophrenia, psychosis, figurative, concretism, first episode psychosis
INTRODUCTION
Language disturbances are key signs of schizophrenia syndrome. They are typically grouped under
the label “Thought Disorders” (TD). This clinical label was originally introduced to emphasize
that schizophrenics’ disorganized speech represents the behavioral manifestation of an underlying
anomalous organization of thought, namely the reduced ability to maintain coherence across
concepts during speech (Bleuler, 1911/1950). Nonetheless, TD has been used over time to
indicate a broader range of schizophrenia linguistic deficits irrespective of their causes (Kuperberg,
2010a). Beyond clinical criteria for language disruption (e.g., derailment, clanging, or poverty of
content; Andreasen, 1986), more fine-grained psycholinguistic assessments suggested that several
high-order language processes are affected in schizophrenia (Kuperberg, 2010b), such as syntax
complexity in production (DeLisi, 2001; Kircher et al., 2005) and comprehension (Perlini et al.,
2012), pragmatics (Covington et al., 2005; Perlini et al., 2012), semantics (for a review, Goldberg
and Weinberger, 2000), and executive functions supporting language abilities (Bagner et al.,
2003).
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A sign of schizophrenics’ high-order language comprehension
impairment is concretism. Concretism consists in the inability to
understand figurative expressions, such as proverbs (for reviews,
Mitchell and Crow, 2005; Thoma and Daum, 2006), idioms
(for a review, Sela et al., 2015), ironic remarks (Rapp et al.,
2013). Figurative language comprehension does not rely on the
compositional analysis of lexical items, like literal utterances;
if the listener tries to keep the literal meaning, overlooking
alternative non-literal ones, the sentence would turn out
nonsensical within the given context. While healthy people can
effortlessly grasp figurative meanings, schizophrenics may not get
rid of the literal meaning, so much that, when asked to paraphrase
figurative expressions, they answer providing idiosyncratic and
bizarre interpretations (e.g., locked cry paraphrased as “a
forgotten sadness, like forgetting to pick up child from school,
which is very sad,” example from Zeev-Wolf et al., 2015).
In the last decades, studies adopting the neuropsychological
approach to concretism have put forward the hypothesis that
the deficit is likely to be the secondary effect of more general
psychological impairments, such as theory of mind (TOM)
anomalies (Gavilán and García-Albea, 2011, 2013), deficits in
executive control over language (Titone et al., 2002; Schettino
et al., 2010), impaired context processing (Strandburg et al., 1997)
and aberrant semantic memory organization (Spitzer, 1997).
Nonetheless, figurative expressions, such as idioms, proverbs,
metaphors, differ in terms of semantic and syntactic structure.
Therefore, the inefficient comprehension of distinct cases of
figurative language may stem from different deficits.
The focus of the present review is to examine metaphor
comprehension in schizophrenia. We aim to provide an
overview of the existing neuropsychological evidence concerning
this aspect of language and its impairment (for a more
broader review, see Thoma and Daum, 2006). First, a brief
introduction on figurative language in general and metaphor in
particular will be provided. Second, the literature concerning the
dysfunctional neurocognitive mechanisms underlying metaphor
comprehension impairment in schizophrenia will be reviewed.
Third, we aim at integrating the available findings. Finally, we
suggest future developments on this topic.
FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE AND
METAPHOR COMPREHENSION
Keeping up with a conversation requires, among several language
skills, the ability to comprehend the additional meanings
not directly expressed in an utterance, i.e., conversational
implicatures (Grice, 1975). The understanding of figurative
expressions represents a special case of conversational
implicature comprehension; indeed, to infer the communicative
intentions of the speaker (i.e., the figurative meaning), the
listener is required to go beyond the literal level of the sentence.
Metaphors constitute a special class of figurative expressions
whose meaning arises from the semantic overlap between two
distant concepts. The first definition comes from Aristotle, who
in Poetics (1457b) defined metaphor as a substitution of a
term with another because of matching attributes. Alternatively,
Quintilian in Institutio Oratoria (VIII, 6, 8), posited that
metaphor is a similitudo brevior (abbreviated simile). Basic
constituents of a metaphor are the tenor and the vehicle (Richards,
1936); the tenor is the subject of the metaphor, while the vehicle is
the semantic domain from which certain attributes are selected
and assigned to the tenor. In cognitive linguistics, other terms
have been used, such as target and source (Kövecses, 2010).
According to the standard approach, the interpretation of the
metaphor Dew is a veil, relies on grasping common attributes
between the target dew and the source veil, such as being
transparent, covering and shimmering (Bowdle and Gentner,
2005).
Metaphors can be classified in various way. First, metaphors
differ in their level of conventionality, that is, how much their
usage is well-established and recurrent in a culture; therefore,
metaphors can be either highly conventional (e.g., Marriage is
a jail) or novel (e.g., She is a loudspeaker). A slightly different
criterion of categorization is the degree of salience: salient
metaphor meaning is very familiar to the individual and already
stored in his/her mental lexicon, whereas unfamiliar metaphor
meaning is unknown or less prominent to him (Giora, 2002;
Bowdle and Gentner, 2005). Second, metaphors can diverge
in the grammatical form of the vehicle; accordingly, nominal
metaphors express the metaphoric meaning by a noun (e.g.,
John is a lion), predicate metaphors by a verb (e.g., Paul often
runs with his mind) and adjective metaphors by an adjective
(e.g., Lucy has an open heart) (Chen et al., 2008; Cacciari et al.,
2011; Sakamoto and Utsumi, 2014). Third, metaphors differ in
their level of aptness, that is the degree to which the vehicle
captures salient attributes of the tenor. Apt metaphors sound
as well-constructed expressions because of the clear analogy
between the two semantic domains (e.g., Memory is a warehouse);
conversely, non-apt metaphors may appear inappropriate or
less intuitive (e.g., His spectacles were sandpaper) (Giora, 2002;
Thibodeau and Durgin, 2011).
Cognitive processes underlying metaphor and, more broadly,
figurative language, comprehension have been extensively
debated. Initially, major attention was devoted to the issue
of clarifying whether literal and figurative meanings are
processed sequentially (Standard Pragmatic Model; Grice, 1975;
Searle, 1979) and/or directly (Glucksberg, 2003). However,
novel approaches suggest that other parameters, beyond the
traditional distinction between literality and figurativeness, are
more relevant for metaphor comprehension, i.e., salience and
conventionality (Giora, 2002; Bowdle and Gentner, 2005; Jung-
Beeman, 2005). The Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 2002)
suggests that the initial lexical access is ruled by the salience of
an expression, regardless of literality/figurativeness. As a general
rule, a salient metaphoric meaning would be retrieved more easily
than an unfamiliar metaphoric one because it is more prominent
into the mental lexicon. However, if the salient meaning is
contextually incompatible, it will be suppressed to overcome
interpretation inappropriacy.
A further hypothesis, the Career of Metaphor model (Bowdle
and Gentner, 2005), postulates that conventional and novel
metaphors require qualitatively different cognitive processes.
Non-conventional metaphors call for an online process of
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comparison that examines the highest as possible number of
attributes of both the vehicle and the tenor in order to reveal
structural similarities among concepts (horizontal alignment).
On the other hand, conventional metaphors require to relate
a certain target attribute to a stored abstract schema of
meaning directly elicited by the vehicle (vertical alignment or
categorization). As a result, a conventional metaphoric meaning
can be accessed faster because it no longer requires the online
comparison of semantic domains, but rather the quick retrieval
of an overlearned structure of meaning from memory.
The Fine-Coarse Semantic Coding Hypothesis (Jung-Beeman,
2005) postulates that the right hemisphere (RH) and the left
hemisphere (LH) are specialized in two different processes of
semantic spreading activation and integration: coarse semantic
coding and fine semantic coding, respectively.
When a word is listened, the LH rapidly triggers a focal
semantic field including closely related meanings; meanwhile,
the RH activates a widespread semantic field comprising
both close and distant meanings. According to this model,
conventional metaphors interpretation mainly stems from the
LH fine coding, since it allows the quick retrieval of the
conventional metaphoric association between the target and the
vehicle. On the other hand, the RH coarse coding fundamentally
contributes to novel metaphor comprehension by integrating the
unusually associated (and hence, distant) terms of the unfamiliar
metaphoric expression.
In the last decades, the neural substrates of figurative
language comprehension have been broadly explored both in
healthy people and clinical populations (for reviews, Thoma
and Daum, 2006; Cacciari and Papagno, 2012). Research to
date has been concentrated on whether the brain deals with
literal and figurative items by recruiting distinct or overlapping
neural resources. Even though earlier studies supported a RH
unique role for figurativeness processing (e.g., Winner and
Gardner, 1977; Bottini et al., 1994), subsequent studies have
challenged this view in favor of a more bilateral, predominantly
left, involvement (e.g., Oliveri et al., 2004; Papagno et al.,
2006; Zempleni et al., 2007; Romero Lauro et al., 2008). Meta-
analytic accounts of functional neuroanatomy of figurative
language comprehension in healthy people has further confirmed
that the comprehension of figurative stimuli at large elicits
a bi-hemispheric fronto-temporal network, wherein stronger
activation foci are left-lateralized (Bohrn et al., 2012; Rapp et al.,
2012). These results are in line with the hypothesis that the LH is
involved in figurative meaning processing and that other factors,
such as verbal stimuli novelty and complexity, may better explain
the extent of the RH recruitment (Coulson and Davenport,
2012). As for metaphors, it has been found that conventional
metaphors elicit a LH fronto-temporal activation, while novel
metaphors elicit a more bilaterally distributed fronto-temporal
network, albeit with stronger left-lateralized activations (Bohrn
et al., 2012; Rapp et al., 2012). The extent of the RH involvement
could be determined, therefore, by the degree of metaphor
unfamiliarity and the RH might be highly involved in capturing
overlapping attributes between distant semantic domains during
novel metaphor processing (Mashal et al., 2007; Pobric et al.,
2008; Faust and Kenett, 2014). Alternatively, the RH recruitment
might be driven by stimuli difficulty, which is more dependent
on specific task-type demands than on figurativeness or novelty
(Yang et al., 2009).
METAPHOR MISINTERPRETATION IN
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Here, we review a set of studies which have addressed metaphor
comprehension in schizophrenia. In the first part, we summarize
all the available literature reporting the experimental approach
and major findings of each study. Studies are grouped according
to the type of test and neuroimaging techniques used to address
the deficit, in the following order: studies that only made used of
semantic comprehension tasks, studies that add the assessment
of other neuropsychological deficits, and then investigations
based on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
magnetoencephalography (MEG), and electroencephalography
(EEG) findings. Finally, we try to integrate reviewed studies.
Methods
Studies were searched on PubMED database by keywords:
“metaphor,” “comprehension,” “schizophrenia.” This search
provided a total of 17 studies. To be included, studies had
to provide an experimental account of the comprehension of
metaphors in schizophrenia via behavioral methods and/or via
neuroimaging techniques (EEG, fMRI, PET, and MEG). There
were no limitations regarding the year of publication. After a first
screening, 9 out of 17 studies were excluded because they did not
specifically test metaphor comprehension. Then, we examined
references of the selected studies and, in this way, we were able to
include 13 additional studies; these studies were retrieved from
Scopus or Web of Science databases. A total of 21 studies was
finally reviewed (see Table 1).
Behavioral Accounts of Metaphor
Misinterpretation
A fairly large body of literature concerns cognitive impairment
underlying the difficulty that people with schizophrenia
encounter when facing a metaphor. Present evidence stems
from different behavioral paradigms and theoretical frameworks
developed over the years. For the sake of completeness, we report
here the available findings.
The first study on metaphor misinterpretation in
schizophrenia dates back to Chapman (1960), who addressed
the proneness of schizophrenic individuals toward literal
vs. figurative interpretation of metaphor. Chapman asked
participants to read literal (e.g., Miss Bailey’s illness turned
her yellow) or metaphoric (e.g., David turned yellow when
he faced the enemy) statements and to choose the correct
interpretation among a literal (i.e., His/Her skin became
discolored), a metaphoric (i.e., He/She become cowardly), and
an unrelated (i.e., He/She become hungry) option. Evaluation
on error trend with respect to controls demonstrated that
schizophrenics more frequently paraphrased metaphors
literally and less frequently interpreted literal sentences
metaphorically, showing an opposite tendency with respect to
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brain-damaged patients with mixed neurological diagnoses.
Later, Cutting and Murphy (1990) based their investigation on
the denotative-connotative distinction. Denotation refers to the
most typical meaning, while connotation refers to a subordinate
meaning. In their metaphor comprehension task, participants
were presented with triads of words they had to group in pairs
according to either the denotative meaning (i.e., semantic
domain, e.g., foolish and loving; antonym, e.g., cold and warm)
or the connotative meaning (i.e., metaphor, e.g., cold and hateful;
polarity, e.g., shallow and hateful) of words. Schizophrenics
showed a stronger tendency to select pairs based on both types of
denotative meaning (semantic domain and antonym) suggesting
that the denotative bias formulation better captures the very
essence of the comprehension deficit.
Overall, these first studies experimentally proved
concretism for metaphors, providing further accounts of
the figurative language deficit beyond the more broadly studied
misinterpretation of proverbs (Thoma and Daum, 2006).
Moreover, they provide the first phenomenological descriptions
of schizophrenics’ metaphor comprehension impairment.
More recently, however, researchers became interested not
only on the type of impairment found in schizophrenics but
also on the underlying mechanism. In the first pool of studies
reviewed below, only metaphor comprehension tasks were
used. Various facets of semantic processing are investigated,
such as semantic spreading into mental lexicon (Spitzer et al.,
1994), novelty of metaphor (Zeev-Wolf et al., 2014), semantic
integrative processes required to handle contextual information
(Iakimova et al., 2006; Chakrabarty et al., 2014), and finally
emotional connotation (Elvevåg et al., 2011).
The first hypothesis put forward suggested that
schizophrenics’ preference for concrete meaning of words
stems from abnormal processes and/or aberrant structure in the
semantic memory (Anand et al., 1994; Spitzer, 1997; Goldberg
and Weinberger, 2000), together with limitations in working
memory (Spitzer et al., 1994). Spitzer et al. (1994) assessed
semantic spreading into mental lexicon with a semantic priming
decision task. During this task, participants listened to a set of
metaphoric sentences that were used to prime target words that
could correspond either to the metaphoric, concrete (i.e., related
to a single word in the sentence) or an unrelated interpretation.
While healthy subjects showed either metaphoric or concrete
priming effects, schizophrenics displayed only concrete priming.
Spitzer et al. (1994) interpreted their results according to earlier
models of language comprehension. These models suggest that
figurative meaning processing takes place only after the literal
meaning has been rejected because it has been judged implausible
in a given context (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979). Because of the
sequential nature of this process, metaphor interpretation
requires additional cognitive resources in comparison to literal
meaning. Based on this theoretical framework, Spitzer et al.
(1994) suggested that working memory deficits could prevent
schizophrenic patients to retain online lexical items until later
stages of meaning processing, leading schizophrenic people to
accept the literal meaning.
The role of salience in metaphor was instead the focus
of interest in Zeev-Wolf et al.’s (2014) study. The authors
predicted that, because of the failure of LH lateralization for
language areas (Crow, 1997), schizophrenics’ semantic coding
would be predominantly coarse (i.e., RH-dependent). As a
result, novel metaphor comprehension would be facilitated
in schizophrenic patients. In this study, the visual hemifield
technique was combined to the semantic priming procedure:
after the priming word (e.g., juicy) was displayed in the
center of the screen, the target word (e.g., gossip) appeared
to the right or the left visual field, with 250 or 750 ms
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). Participants had to judge
whether the word pair was meaningful. Presenting the target
word in one of the visual hemifield provides the contralateral
hemisphere with a relative advantage in processing the word
pair. The comparison between performances relative to each
hemisphere allowed quantifying the extent of coarse vs. fine
semantic coding with respect to different types of metaphor.
The two SOAs permitted probing the prominence of coarse vs.
fine semantic coding at earlier and later phases of processing.
As predicted, TD schizophrenic patients underperformed
healthy participants with respect to all stimulus types (literal,
conventional metaphoric, and unrelated pairs), but outperformed
relative to novel metaphors. This result was coupled with a
consistent over-reliance on RH coarse coding across conditions.
The authors argued that this phenomenon entails two effects. On
the one hand, subordinate literal meanings are uselessly active
during conventional metaphors comprehension. On the other
hand, distant unfamiliar associations are readily activated during
novel stimuli comprehension. This latter, however, represents
an advantage with novel meaningful (i.e., novel metaphors),
but a disadvantage with novel nonsensical (i.e., unrelated pairs)
stimuli. The abnormal coarse coding implies a broken interplay
between RH and LH that makes LH unable to suppress irrelevant
or meaningless associations (Pobric et al., 2008). As a result,
the ability to discriminate between novel meaningful (i.e.,
novel metaphors) and novel nonsensical (i.e., unrelated pairs)
expressions is significantly limited.
Another study (Chakrabarty et al., 2014) examined the effect
of salience on metaphor comprehension in schizophrenia also
considering the effect of sentence context. To address these two
issues, novel and conventional metaphor comprehension was
evaluated both in minimal context and in sentence context. First,
participants performed a semantic judgment task on two-words
stimuli (e.g., novel metaphor pair: sweet pain), where they
had to judge if the two words were metaphorically related,
literally related or unrelated. Second, they accomplished a
sentence completion task by selecting proper targets of literally
biased, metaphorically biased or unbiased sentences (e.g., novel
metaphor biased: The sweet [pain] of motherhood is every
woman’s dream). Results demonstrated that schizophrenics were,
overall, less able to deal with both conventional and novel
metaphors. However, schizophrenics’ performance improved
on the sentence completion task, with a larger increase for
conventional metaphors. These results stress that sentence
context processing is intact in schizophrenia because it improves
metaphor comprehension, with a stronger effect of facilitation
on the retrieval of conventional metaphoric meanings. By using
a different methodological approach, Iakimova et al. (2006)
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investigated which type of context processing mostly occurs in
schizophrenia when these patients are presented with metaphoric
sentences. The authors argued that sentence processing might be
affected by two different tendencies in schizophrenia, namely the
concreteness bias (i.e., anchoring to a single word in the sentence)
and the literality bias (i.e., whole-sentence processing biased
toward word-by-word analysis). In their study, participants were
invited to read familiar metaphoric sentences (e.g., That sound
makes my blood run cold) and to select the correct answer among
a list of four words related to the figurative (e.g., fright), the
concrete (e.g., red), the literal (e.g., freezing), or an unrelated
(e.g., flower) interpretation of the sentence. Schizophrenics, as
depressed patients, showed a higher percentage of both literal
and concrete misinterpretations than controls, indicating that
literality bias and concrete bias co-occur in these psychiatric
populations.
Finally, Elvevåg et al. (2011) hypothesized that the retrieval of
the metaphoric meaning might be affected by the difficulty to deal
with emotionally-laden concepts in schizophrenia. Participants,
therefore, were asked to paraphrase metaphors that could have
emotional (e.g., He was burning with desire) or neutral (e.g., His
brain is a computer) connotation. The emotional connotation
more frequently induced the metaphoric interpretation in both
schizophrenics and healthy controls; however, schizophrenics
still produced more literal interpretations. In our view, these
results suggest that an emotional content in metaphors does not
increase or decrease schizophrenics’ tendency toward literality.
Differently from the studies reported above, the following
ones searched for direct and overt evidence of the association
between cognitive deficits and impaired metaphor processing. To
this aim, additional neuropsychological tests were administered
besides a metaphor comprehension task. In general, these studies
investigate whether deficits of ToM, intelligence quotient (IQ)
and executive functions have an impact on the comprehension
of metaphor in schizophrenia.
Theory of mind is the ability to infer the content of others’
mental states, i.e., their beliefs and intentions. ToM tasks usually
explore two different inferential abilities: the acknowledgment of
a character’s belief about the world in a short story (i.e., first-
order false beliefs) and the acknowledgment of what a character
thinks about another character’s thoughts (i.e., second-order false
beliefs).
In the wake of the finding that ToM abilities may strongly
predict the comprehension of metaphor and irony in autism
(Happé, 1993), ToM assessment has been carried out together
with the evaluation of pragmatic communication deficits also
in schizophrenia. Happé’s findings, specifically, suggested a links
between metaphor comprehension and first-order ToM (i.e., the
ability to infer the speaker’s intention to convey a non-literal
meaning) and between irony comprehension and second-order
ToM (i.e., the ability to recognize the speaker’s intention to
express the opposite of the apparent meaning of the utterance).
A couple of studies used irony and metaphor comprehension
performances as indirect evidence of ToM impairments in
schizophrenia (Drury et al., 1998; Herold et al., 2002). Drury
et al. (1998) tested the hypothesis that during an acute episode
of schizophrenic symptoms, patients would show both first-order
and second-order ToM deficits, whereas patients suffering from
paranoid symptomatology would specifically present second-
order ToM problems. First, patients were asked to comprehend
ironic and metaphoric statements embedded in a story context.
Second, they performed a metaphor sentence completion task, in
which they had to choose the item that completed the presented
metaphoric sentence from a list of words (e.g., The dancer
was so graceful. She really was. . . [a swan]). Schizophrenics in
acute phase performed as good as the control groups on the
metaphor sentence completion task. As for the second task,
they poorly understood metaphors, but they did not show
difficulties with irony comprehension. In the authors’ view,
this scarce comprehension of metaphors cannot be the effect
of a ToM dysfunction. Indeed, if first-order ToM competence
underlies metaphor comprehension, the poor understanding of
metaphor would not be consistent with the spared higher-order
ToM, proved by good comprehension of irony. As for paranoid
symptoms, they were not associated to an impairment either in
metaphor or irony comprehension.
Herold et al. (2002), instead, investigated whether ToM
impairment recovers with the remission of acute paranoid
symptoms. Remitted patients were found to properly interpret
metaphors embedded in a story, but to poorly understand irony.
In Herold et al.’s (2002) view, these findings are indicative of
preserved first-order ToM, but defective second-order ToM in
paranoids in remission. It should be noted, however, that the
two foregoing studies used control groups composed by patients
suffering from other psychiatric diseases and by vaguely defined
non-psychiatric subjects, respectively. The absence of healthy
controls might have prevented the schizophrenics’ metaphor
comprehension deficit to clearly emerge.
Other factors have been considered to explain metaphor
misinterpretation in schizophrenia, namely reduced executive
control and general intelligence decline. In Langdon et al. (2002),
schizophrenic patients were found to be less able than healthy
participants to judge the appropriateness of metaphoric and
ironic utterances embedded in a story context. Importantly,
false-belief picture sequencing score significantly predicted irony
but not metaphor comprehension accuracy when inhibitory
suppression (measured with capture picture sequencing task),
executive planning (Tower of London test) and general
intellectual capacity (digit forward-backward; Spot-the-Word
test) were taken into account. Hence, ToM impairments did not
crucially contribute to the poor comprehension of metaphor in
the schizophrenic group. The authors argued that a different
cognitive dysfunction, beyond the executive deficit, is more
likely to underlie metaphor misinterpretation, i.e., a semantic
impairment (Goldberg and Weinberger, 2000).
Focusing on ToM and executive deficits, Champagne-Lavau
and Stip (2010) asked participants to orally provide the meaning
of novel and conventional metaphoric sentences (e.g., This
bus is a turtle – My friend has a heavy heart). Schizophrenic
patients underperformed healthy controls in comprehension of
both novel and conventional metaphors. These between-group
differences remained significant when controlled for time at
the Trial Making Test B, number of perseveration errors and
number of completed categories at the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 May 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 670
fpsyg-09-00670 May 7, 2018 Time: 23:5 # 9
Rossetti et al. Metaphor in Schizophrenia
Test. However, differences disappeared when adjusted by ToM
(ascertained with first- and second-order false-belief questions).
In this study, therefore, ToM disabilities were considered
to contribute to difficulties with conventional metaphor in
schizophrenia. Conversely, the lack of set shifting skills and the
poor cognitive flexibility were excluded from major factors.
By using different metaphor tasks, Mossaheb et al. (2014)
investigated the relationship between several measures
of frontally mediated functions, analogical thinking and
verbal intelligence and the comprehension of metaphor in
schizophrenia. To evaluate novel metaphor comprehension,
they used triads of verbal items to associate in pairs. Participants
had to recognize as many meaningful pairs as possible and
then explain the meaning of the found associations. Possible
combinations could depend on an affective association (e.g.,
woman crying – willow tree), perceptual analogy between
concepts (e.g., sunflower – tall thin woman) and category-
overlapping similarities (e.g., snorting bull – man boxing).
Performance on this task was lower in the schizophrenic group
and largely predicted by Wechsler’s vocabulary subtest. A second
task focused instead on the comprehension of conventional
metaphoric sentences (i.e., proverbs; e.g., We are all in the same
boat) to interpret via free paraphrasing or via multiple-choice.
Performance on this task was also poorer in schizophrenic
subjects, however, it was largely predicted by time at Trial
Making Test B, used in the study to ascertain cognitive flexibility.
Moreover, patients’ performance on proverbs multiple-choice
task was significantly correlated with Wechsler’s verbal IQ
subtests, Raven’s matrices test, Trial Making Test and Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test. Overall, these results suggest that difficulties to
comprehend metaphors are signs of a more generalized cognitive
impairment. At a speculative level, the authors argued that these
difficulties might be part of a broader executive dysfunction
stemming from the well-known neuropathological abnormalities
in frontal cortices in schizophrenia.
General intelligence was controlled for in a couple of
studies. This procedure should allow evaluating to which
extent schizophrenics’ cognitive disorders affect metaphor
comprehension. In Mo et al.’s (2008) study, remitted
schizophrenic patients understood metaphoric utterances
embedded in a story context less successfully relative to
healthy controls, even when the comparison was carried out
on subgroups of matching verbal IQ. In addition, accuracy
in metaphor interpretation was significantly predicted
by second-order false-belief questions; conversely, neither
first-order false-belief questions nor general IQ were significant
predictors. Even though such results statistically accounted for
an association between ToM deficits and metaphor performance,
the authors excluded that poor mind-reading is strongly involved
in metaphor interpretation deficit in schizophrenia. Conversely,
Mo et al. (2008) suggested that, because metaphors and ToM
tasks are highly demanding in terms of semantic processing,
a higher-order deficit in semantics is likely to account for the
observed poor performances on both tasks.
Similarly, Varga et al. (2014) assessed metaphor
comprehension and IQ. They recruited only paranoid subtype
patients with a normal IQ to increase the homogeneity of the
experimental group. Salience of metaphor was also considered
by assessing comprehension of conventional and novel metaphor
embedded in a story. To take into account the IQ level, the
patient group was split into higher-IQ and lower-IQ subgroups.
Higher-IQ paranoids demonstrated to be as proficient as healthy
controls in novel and conventional metaphor comprehension.
Conversely, lower-IQ paranoids showed only a preserved
conventional metaphor comprehension. In Varga et al. (2014)
view, the preserved general cognitive abilities would permit
novel metaphors understanding in higher-IQ patients because
they compensate for the ToM deficit. Conversely, unimpaired
semantic processing (as indicated by the observation of good
comprehension of literal items) might explain the good accuracy
demonstrated in conventional metaphor comprehension in both
lower-IQ and higher-IQ patient subgroups.
Finally, we mention the study of Tavano et al. (2008) who
examined the relationship between metaphor and syntactic
comprehension in schizophrenia. With respect to healthy
controls, patients provided significantly less appropriate
paraphrases of conventional metaphors and opaque idioms
(i.e., highly conventionalized figurative expressions, with only
a remote relationship between literal and figurative meaning;
Cacciari and Papagno, 2012). However, in this study a verbal
explanation was required and production definitely involves
executive control. Since the level of metaphor and idiom
comprehension correlates with the accuracy in syntactic
comprehension, the authors suggested that that poorer syntactic
comprehension may partially underlie misinterpretation of
idiom and metaphor. This is similar to what has been found by
Papagno et al. (2004) in aphasic patients. Indeed, difficulties in
idiom comprehension in these patients seemed to be due to the
fact that they rely on a literal first strategy, accessing a figurative
interpretation only when the linguistic analysis fails to yield
acceptable results.
Neurophysiological and Neurofunctional
Accounts of Metaphor Misinterpretation
Up to now, limited work has been carried out by means of
neurophysiological and neuroimaging methodologies. In this
section we report results based on fMRI, EEG, and MEG data.
An ERP study (Iakimova et al., 2005) dealt with the processing
of semantic context in schizophrenia with respect to conventional
metaphoric literally implausible, literal, or incongruous endings
of sentence (e.g., metaphor: He is away in the. . . clouds) displayed
on a screen in rapid serial visual presentation. Participants
were required to judge the meaningfulness of items. Iakimova
et al. (2005) focused on the N400 component because this
is linked to the ability to infer the final word of a sentence
from the sentence context. Schizophrenic patients showed lower
accuracy, higher reaction times and larger N400 amplitude
than healthy controls in all types of sentences. The N400
pattern suggested that schizophrenic patients are less able to
integrate pieces of information forming the semantic context of
a sentence; however, this problem is not specific for metaphor
comprehension, but affects metaphoric as well as literal language
comprehension.
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Kircher et al. (2007) analyzed the neurofunctional correlates
of metaphor comprehension of participants accomplishing a
valence judgment task (i.e., to judge the positive or negative
connotation of the sentence) with novel metaphors (e.g., The
lovers words are harp sounds) and literal sentences (e.g., The
lovers words are lies). The contrast between novel metaphor
and baseline conditions compared between groups showed that
schizophrenics activate to a major extent the left inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG), but to a lesser degree the right middle and superior
temporal gyrus (MTG and STG). Moreover, the maximum
activation in the left IFG was more dorsally located than in
controls and correlated with severity ratings of abstract thinking.
Kircher et al. (2007) hypothesized that concretism may arise from
an abnormal engagement of the left IFG and a poor recruitment
of the right temporal cortex.
A more recent study (Mashal et al., 2013) suggested that
schizophrenics might abnormally engage left frontal cortices to
deal with novelty of metaphors. To explore the neural substrates
of the ability to map semantic associations between words,
Mashal et al. (2013) presented literal (e.g., birth weight), novel
metaphoric (e.g., hatred net), conventional metaphoric (e.g.,
sharp tongue) or meaningless (e.g., road bees) two-word stimuli.
Participants had to silently judge the pairs meaningfulness. The
effect of metaphoricity of novel metaphors was associated to a
different pattern of activation enhancement in the two groups:
the right IFG and the right SFG in controls, whereas the left
MFG, the left inferior parietal lobule and the left precuneus
in schizophrenic individuals. The additional activation of the
left MFG and parietal cortices in schizophrenia would represent
the need for compensative cognitive strategies to increase the
comprehension of figurative aspects of stimuli. A left-lateralized
abnormal recruitment was also detected for novelty: healthy
controls were found to more strongly engage the right IFG and
SFG to process metaphor novelty, whereas schizophrenics the
left MFG. The authors suggested that this latter finding might
correspond to the additional working memory resources that
schizophrenics employ to process the more demanding novel
metaphors as compared to conventional metaphors. A further
study (Mashal et al., 2014) highlighted that in schizophrenics, but
not in controls, there was a significant functional connectivity
between the precuneus and fronto-temporal cortices, suggesting
that precuneus activation in schizophrenia might provide
mental imagery support during both literal and novel metaphor
comprehension.
Zeev-Wolf et al. (2015) used MEG to obtain a more
fine-grained account of the time course of neural activity
during metaphor comprehension in schizophrenia. In this
study participants carried out a semantic decision task in
visual hemifield presentation (as in Zeev-Wolf et al., 2014).
As previously found (Zeev-Wolf et al., 2014), schizophrenics
outperformed healthy participants in judging the meaningfulness
of novel metaphors, but they were less accurate with literal,
conventional metaphoric and unrelated pairs. MEG data showed
that patients overactivated the right fronto-temporal cortex at
earlier stages of semantic processing with all stimulus types,
providing evidence for a disrupted early-stage LH dominance and
inefficient inter-hemispheric interplay. With respect to healthy
controls, novel metaphor comprehension elicited a stronger
right-lateralized fronto-temporal activation, whereas unrelated
pairs elicited a stronger right fronto-temporal activation together
with a left frontal activation. As commented by the authors,
RH overactivation might indicate a strong proneness to coarse
semantic coding, i.e., an abnormal integration of distantly-
related semantic concepts. This proneness to coarse coding
is advantageous in the case of meaningful pairs (i.e., novel
metaphor), but imposes a higher effort for deciding the
meaningfulness (i.e., bilateral frontal areas recruitment) in the
case of meaningless pairs (i.e., unrelated pairs).
Psychopathology and Metaphor
Misinterpretation
Several studies report correlations between the symptomatology
and the level of metaphor comprehension.
Concretism is clinically assessed by proverbs comprehension
questions (Kay et al., 1987). Two fMRI studies found that
the abnormal recruitment of left IFG/MFG during metaphoric
stimuli processing negatively correlates with the score of concrete
thinking severity (Kircher et al., 2007; Mashal et al., 2013).
Comprehension of conventional metaphor negatively correlates
with concretism in a couple of studies (Mashal et al., 2013; Piovan
et al., 2016); no correlations was found for novel metaphors
(Mashal et al., 2013). This distinct pattern of correlation is not
surprising given that the assessment of concretism consists in the
comprehension of conventional linguistic stimuli.
Iakimova et al. (2006) noted that, those patients who showed
concreteness and literality bias, obtained a higher general
rating of TD (assessed by means of the Scale for Thought,
Language and Communication disorders; Andreasen, 1979). By
separately considering negative TD (e.g., poverty of speech,
blocking and increased latency) and positive TD (e.g., derailment,
tangentiality, and incoherence), Langdon et al. (2002) found
metaphor misinterpretation to be associated only to negative
signs of TD.
More interestingly, metaphor comprehension performance
turned out to be negatively correlated with negative symptoms
(Langdon et al., 2002; Mossaheb et al., 2014) such as apathy
and anhedonia (Langdon et al., 2002). However, not all studies
detected these significant correlations (Tavano et al., 2008;
Champagne-Lavau and Stip, 2010; Zeev-Wolf et al., 2014).
Siddi et al. (2016) directly searched for associations
between figurative language impairment and auditory verbal
hallucinations in a large group of psychotic patients (both
schizophrenia spectrum disorders and bipolar disorders),
controlling for the confounding effects of frontal abilities.
They found that propensity to suffer from verbal auditory
hallucinations could be moderately predicted by their capability
to understand metaphor, but not idiom.
Putative Mechanisms Underlying
Metaphor Misinterpretation
Schizophrenia is characterized by several neuropathological
changes in both cortical and subcortical areas, such as
fronto-temporal cortices, the thalamus, the amygdala and the
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hippocampus (Maggioni et al., 2016), together with white matter
disruptions (Brambilla et al., 2005; Andreone et al., 2007;
Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2012). These abnormalities are believed
to constitute the neuroanatomical basis of the widespread
neuropsychological impairment demonstrated in individuals
with schizophrenia (Heinrichs and Zakzanis, 1998; Vöhringer
et al., 2013; Bortolato et al., 2015). From this perspective,
the general neurocognitive dysfunction may severely affect
the capability to successfully undertake metaphoric language
processing in schizophrenia. To provide a more detailed outline
of the specific cognitive mechanisms underlying metaphor
comprehension impairment, in the current section we compare
major findings from studies reviewed above. Importantly,
several aspects of metaphor comprehension in schizophrenia
are still unclear and deserve further investigation; therefore, our
conclusions are speculative.
As rather consistently reported, while metaphors can
be intuitively understood by healthy people, they pose
greater cognitive demand to schizophrenic subjects. Broadly
speaking, schizophrenics struggle to understand both novel and
conventional metaphors (Champagne-Lavau and Stip, 2010;
Mashal et al., 2013, 2014; Chakrabarty et al., 2014; Mossaheb
et al., 2014; Varga et al., 2014). Emerging evidence, however,
has pointed to different deficits underlying misinterpretation of
conventional and novel metaphors (Mashal et al., 2013, 2014;
Chakrabarty et al., 2014; Varga et al., 2014; Zeev-Wolf et al., 2014,
2015).
A first account supporting this claim is provided by
neurofunctional findings. Schizophrenics demonstrated a
stronger activation of the left MFG during novel metaphor
compared to conventional metaphor comprehension. This
pattern of activation is abnormally left-lateralized with
respect to the enhanced recruitment of the right IFG and
SFG observed in neurotypical individuals. The increased left
MFG activation elicited by novel metaphors in schizophrenic
individuals may thus represent the neural substrate of an
inefficient strategy adopted to deal with the higher cognitive
demand made by novelty as compared to conventionality
of metaphors (Mashal et al., 2013). Similarly, Kircher et al.
(2007) found that comprehension of non-salient metaphors
in schizophrenia is characterized by an abnormal activation
of the left frontal cortex, together with a weaker engagement
of the right MTG/STG. Nonetheless, these first findings do
not allow a direct comparison of novel and conventional
metaphors (i.e., all metaphors were non-salient). In addition,
differently from Mashal et al. (2013) these results are based
on sentence stimuli; therefore, they do not allow ruling
out the role of semantic processing elicited by the sentence
context.
As demonstrated in Zeev-Wolf et al. (2015), semantic
processing in schizophrenia is characterized by a
greater magnetoencephalographic component in the RH
fronto-temporal regions. RH overactivation seems therefore
to constitute the neural substrate for an excessive semantic
integration between presented words and related concepts
(i.e., over-abundance of coarse semantic coding), which
is demonstrated by the apparent competence with novel
metaphorical stimuli and by the limited ability to recognize novel
meaningless stimuli.
Despite different spatial and temporal resolutions strongly
limit the comparison between different techniques, fMRI and
MEG findings concerning novel metaphor comprehension can
provide complementary evidence. We speculatively suggest
that the hyperactivation of the left frontal cortex observed
in fMRI studies (Mashal et al., 2013, 2014) might reflect the
abnormal need for selection processes (e.g., working memory
load and/or inhibitory suppression) in trying to manage the
exaggerated amount of semantic associations produced by the
dysfunctional early-stage RH overactivation (Zeev-Wolf et al.,
2014, 2015).
Support for the idea that the impairment of novel and
conventional metaphor comprehension is heterogeneous comes
also from neuropsychological studies, because they overall
suggest that different cognitive mechanisms underlie the reduced
comprehension of these two types of metaphor.
Varga et al. (2014) found that, among individuals of normal
general intelligence (measured by means of WAIS), those
with lower levels of general intelligence poorly comprehended
novel metaphors, but still understood conventional metaphors.
These findings, thus, suggest the need for higher cognitive
competence to process novel metaphors. A number of studies
(Champagne-Lavau and Stip, 2010; Mossaheb et al., 2014)
also looked for different cognitive measures accounting for
distinct causative impairments. In a study (Mossaheb et al.,
2014), the comprehension of metaphoric proverbs was linked
to cognitive flexibility skills and the ability to detect novel
metaphors was associated to the level of vocabulary (measured
by the dedicated Wechsler’s subtest). Conversely, in another
study (Champagne-Lavau and Stip, 2010) cognitive flexibility
and set shifting (considered executive functions, that the authors
assessed by means of the Trial Making Test and Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test) were not found to significantly contribute
either to schizophrenics’ impaired comprehension of novel
or conventional metaphors. Findings concerning conventional
metaphors are hard to integrate given the overtly divergent
results related to cognitive flexibility. Nonetheless, it could be
argued that other executive functions tests, such as working
memory tests, could have better controlled for schizophrenics’
metaphor comprehension because low working memory abilities
might prevent schizophrenic patients to maintain the verbal
string online while retrieving the metaphoric meaning from the
mental lexicon (Schettino et al., 2010). Overall, different executive
deficits might account for the inefficient comparison between
attributes of distant semantic domains (i.e., novel metaphors)
and for the retrieval of a stored schema of meaning (as for
conventional metaphors). This aspect, however, deserves future
attention since only very limited and inconclusive evidence is
available so far.
A further concern consists in the role of context processing
during metaphor comprehension. Chakrabarty et al. (2014), who
systematically controlled for the effect of sentence context, found
that contextual information can reduce the misinterpretation
of conventional metaphor to a greater extent than novel
metaphor. Therefore, processing of conventional metaphor is
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less severely impaired because it can benefit of the facilitation
effect provided by the availability of contextual information
(i.e., metaphorical association embedded in a sentence), which
in other terms supports the processes of retrieval of the
conventional meaning from long term memory (Giora, 2003).
Conversely, the comprehension of novel metaphor, whose
meaning is not stored into mental lexicon, turns out to be
more disrupted. As the authors underline, the facilitation
effect due to contextual cues is 37.1% less in the case of
novel metaphor comprehension as compared to conventional
metaphor. Results of Chakrabarty et al. (2014) in addition,
imply that context processing is preserved in schizophrenia. This
account is inconsistent with two studies of Iakimova et al. (2005,
2006) that support instead the failure of context processing,
both in literal and metaphorical language. Nonetheless, the
apparent inconsistency might be the result of the different
methods adopted to investigate context processing. First, the
latter studies did not compare two-words metaphors with
metaphorical sentence (as in Chakrabarty et al., 2014), but all
the experimental stimuli were metaphorical sentences (Iakimova
et al., 2005, 2006). Moreover, Iakimova et al. (2005) probed
the integration of contextual information by displaying sentence
words in rapid serial visual presentation, whereas Chakrabarty
et al. (2014) presented the whole sentence on the screen;
these two types of stimulus presentation may pose a different
working memory demand. Second, Iakimova et al. (2005, 2006)
were not primarily interested in exploring salience (i.e., their
metaphors consisted in commonly used expressions) and this
might have somehow prevented to differentiate between literal
and metaphoric comprehension in the schizophrenics group.
Overall, these studies (Iakimova et al., 2005, 2006; Chakrabarty
et al., 2014) provide partially comparable pieces of evidence
on context processing during metaphor comprehension in
schizophrenia. Future work addressing this issue with respect to
the salience of metaphor is thus desirable.
Finally, several studies addressed the role of defective
mind-reading in metaphor comprehension in individuals with
schizophrenia (Drury et al., 1998; Herold et al., 2002; Langdon
et al., 2002; Mo et al., 2008; Champagne-Lavau and Stip, 2010).
Among the studies that directly examined the relationship
between these two deficits (Langdon et al., 2002; Mo et al., 2008;
Champagne-Lavau and Stip, 2010), two out of three statistically
accounted for a link (Mo et al., 2008; Champagne-Lavau and
Stip, 2010). However, only Champagne-Lavau and Stip (2010)
give explicit support to the hypothesis that ToM is a possible
antecedent of metaphor misinterpretation, and specifically, of
conventional metaphor misinterpretation. Overall, ToM deficit
seems to be more likely involved in the impaired comprehension
of other figurative expressions that pose a greater demand for
mind-reading, e.g., irony (Langdon et al., 2002).
To sum up, metaphor misinterpretation in schizophrenia
might be the sign of a disrupted communication between
executive functions and semantics. At the least for now, a
more detailed outline of the deficit is prevented by the fact
that evidence concerning each deficit is very limited, mostly
as concerned the executive domain. Moreover, a substantial
variety of theoretical backgrounds both in terms of figurative
language comprehension models and metaphoric stimulus type
critically reduces the possibility for systematic comparisons.
Finally, the investigation has been often conducted on relatively
small samples, a fact that strongly reduce statistical power of the
results.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
The comprehension of metaphor in schizophrenia is still an open
issue that warrants future experimental consideration at least for
two reasons.
First, metaphors represent a real-world communication
problem for schizophrenics. Because metaphors are ubiquitous
in ordinary conversation (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980),
schizophrenics are very often exposed to misunderstand
the speaker’s intention of conveying a metaphoric meaning.
This increases patients’ proneness to violate the conversational
maxim of cooperation (Grice, 1975) with implications for social
functioning (e.g., social withdrawal; Mitchell and Crow, 2005;
Champagne-Lavau and Stip, 2010).
Second, neuropsychological and neurofunctional
underpinnings of metaphor misinterpretation may intriguingly
cast light on the neuropathological organization of the syndrome
(Chakrabarty et al., 2014; Faust and Kenett, 2014). Crow (1997)
has hypothesized that nuclear symptoms of schizophrenia might
be “spill-over effects” of the reduced lateralization of neural
areas strictly devoted to the faculty of language and that the
observed difficulties with metaphoric speech in schizophrenia
might be a side-effect of the aberrant hemispheric organization
of the brain (Mitchell and Crow, 2005). Intriguingly, metaphor
comprehension relies on fronto-temporal cortices recruitment,
the neural areas mostly affected by the neuropathology of
schizophrenia (Ellison-Wright et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2009;
Gutiérrez-Galve et al., 2014).
Several aspects deserve future attention. First, the possible
relation among metaphoric comprehension impairment,
different diagnostic profiles and psychopathology. Second,
the assessment of other kinds of metaphors beyond nominal
metaphors (e.g., predicate metaphors; Cacciari et al., 2011).
A further issue to emphasize is the fact that the examination
of schizophrenics’ metaphoric comprehension has been mostly
accomplished on patients with well-established illness, ignoring
the impact of different antipsychotic drugs on cognitive functions
(Ferreira et al., 2016). Conversely, there is very little evidence of
concretism at the initial stages of schizophrenia (Anand et al.,
1994; Baltaxe and Simmons, 1995; Perlini et al., 2018). Studying
metaphoric language impairment in first episode psychoses
(FEPs) can take advantage from the fact that the confounding
effects of chronicity and antipsychotic medication on cognition
and neuroanatomy can be relatively ruled out. Several aspects
of the illness, likely related to metaphor misunderstanding, are
detectable since the onset, such as language disorders (Ayer
et al., 2016; Roche et al., 2016) and the general neurocognitive
deterioration (Mesholam-Gately et al., 2009). In the light of
this, the investigation of metaphor comprehension at the
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very beginning of the illness may crucially contribute to the
investigation of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying
concretism.
Moreover, the elucidation of the underpinnings of metaphor
comprehension in FEPs could take indirectly advantage from the
assessment of language outcome following a cognitive training
plan. Protocols for cognitive remediation usually target several
neurocognitive functions (e.g., Lindenmayer et al., 2008; Vita
et al., 2011) and they seem to moderately ameliorate global
cognition in schizophrenic patients (McGurk et al., 2007; Wykes
et al., 2011) with effects of learning-induced neuroplasticity (Haut
et al., 2010; Isaac and Januel, 2015), even in response to untrained
tasks (Ramsay and MacDonald, 2015). This raises the possibility
that cognitive intervention on FEPs (that generally benefit more
than chronic patients from cognitive treatment plans) might
positively impact on metaphoric processing, providing indirect
information about the cognitive abilities that better account for
the initial decline of metaphor comprehension.
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